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Abstract
This paper analyses technology transfer and innovation activities by the
high cost firm in a Cournot duopoly framework, where technology transfer
between the firms may occur after the innovation decision. The two effects of
innovation are to access the superior technology of the low cost firm if higher
cost prohibits technology transfer and to affect the pricing rule of technology
transfer via higher bargaining power. The incentive for innovation is more
in fixed-fee licensing than in two-part tariff (royalty) licensing if cost differ-
ence between firms is low. The possibility of licensing, irrespective of the
licensing scheme, encourages innovation if the cost difference between the
firms is high.
JEL classification: L 24, D 45
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1. Introduction
Technology transfer is an area of long standing interest in the literature
of industrial organization. Broadly, two possible channels have been identi-
fied via which an inefficient firm can acquire the superior technology (there
by reducing cost of production). It can buy the technology directly from
the research labs/outside innovators (see Kamien & Tauman (1986), Katz
1I am indebted to Dr. Sukanta Bhattacharya, University of Calcutta, for his valu-
able comments and suggestions. The author also wishes to thank Dr. Arijit Mukherjee,
Loughborough University, for his observations on the present work. The usual disclaimer
applies.
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& Shapiro (1985)), or may buy it from the more efficient (rival/producing)
firm (see Marjit (1990), Wang (1998, 2002), Fauli-Oller & Sandonis (2002)
etc). The present paper is related to the second genre of literature, where
the low cost firm licenses its technology to the high cos firm at an appro-
priate price. A parallel strand of literature in industrial organization deals
with innovation in an oligopolistic framework. In Cournot oligopoly struc-
ture Delbono & Denicolo (1991) have captured the effect of increase in the
number of firms on the equilibrium R&D effort of each firm.2 Reinganum
(1983) shows that in presence of technological uncertainty3 the incumbent
firm, after a sufficiently high share of the post-innovation market, invests
less on a given project than the challenger.
Several attempts have been made later to incorporate technology trans-
fer and cost reducing innovation in Cournot competitive market. Gallini &
Winter (1985) is the initial work to consider the interaction between licens-
ing opportunities and innovation incentives. It shows that the availability
of royalty licensing encourages research when the firms’ initial production
technologies are close in costs and discourages research when initial costs
are asymmetric. However, Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2013) shows that
fixed-fee licensing decreases innovation while under a two-part tariff licens-
ing contract licensing increases innovation. Chang et al. (2013) also shows
that if the licensor firms R&D efficiency is high, the availability of licensing
subdues the firms R&D incentive, leading to a lower social welfare level. All
these works consider that producing firms internal to the industry make the
innovation decision. There is also a parallel literature which deals in com-
paring innovation incentives of the patentee internal to firm vs the external
patentee. Sen and Tauman (2007) and Fauli-Oller et al. (2013) contributes
to this field.
The present paper, however, is of the first genre, where in a Cournot
duopoly the higher cost firm decides for innovation in the pre-licensing stage.
It incorporates technology transfer and cost reducing innovation simulta-
neously, where technology transfer between the firms may occur after the
innovation decision is made by the high cost firm. Licensing can be ei-
2It shows that an increase in the number of firms may results in a decrease in the equi-
librium R&D effort of each firm and the equilibrium total effort may be underinvestment
with respect to social optimum.
3Technological uncertainty takes the form of a stochastic relationship between the rate
of investment and the eventual date of successful completion of the new technology.
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ther through payment of fixed-fee, per-unit royalty or two-part tariff. Using
Nash-bargaining the optimal volume of payments are also identified for these
different forms of licensing contract4. In fixed-fee licensing, the technology
is transferred if the cost difference between the firms is low. Contrarily in
two-part tariff licensing scheme, where optimality ensures only positive roy-
alty, whatever be the cost difference technology is always transferred.
In the present era of globalization and integration technology transfer
between firms has become more common than ever (See Vishwasrao, 2007).
The present model can be used to envisage a role of the government in the
developing countries. It can be assumed that the low cost firm and the high
cost firm are located in developed and developing respectively and compete
in quantities in the market of the developing country. In this regard the
present paper is built on the assumption that the low cost firm is passive
in regards to innovation, as the objection is examine the effect of licensing
opportunities on high cost firm’s R&D incentives. It therefore analyses inno-
vation incentives only of the high-cost firm under different forms of licensing
contract.5 The present work also highlights the innovation incentives of the
high-cost firm even if it knows that it cannot outstrip the low cost firm
in cost. Hence, the two possible effects of innovation are: i) accessing the
superior technology of the low cost firm if higher cost prohibits technology
transfer and ii) affecting the pricing rule of technology transfer via higher
bargaining power.
A number of empirical studies, for example Deolalikar and Evenson
(1989), Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Ferrantino (1992) and Hu et al. (2005)
have been concerned with relationship between R&D and technology trans-
fer. As reported in these works technology transfer and R&D can be either
be complements or substitutes. It was believed that the transfer of technol-
ogy from foreign can reduce indigenous R&D effort and therefore the Indian
government restricted the purchase of foreign technology (Deolalikar and
Evenson, 1989). The present paper therefore is an attempt to explain the
relation of technology transfer and R&D, i.e either complements or substi-
tutes, in terms of cost difference between the firms. It shows that both in
4See Kishimoto & Moto (2012) and Monerris & Vannetelbosch (2001) for a similar type
of analysis
5In empirical literature the interaction of domestic R&D and (foreign) technology trans-
fer is an important issue. Hu et al. (2005) for example study this interaction in the context
of Chinese industry.
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fixed-fee as well as in two-part tariff (royalty) licensing, allowing licensing
(removing barriers) discourages innovation (research) if the cost difference
is low.6 This result is in contrast to Gallini & Winter (1985), where in a
duopoly the availability of royalty licensing encourages research when the
firms’ initial production technologies are close in costs and discourages re-
search when initial costs are asymmetric. In the present model technology
transfer and R&D exhibits to be substitutes if the cost difference is low, as
in such case licensing reduces the incentives for investment in innovation.
However, the relation is complementary if the cost difference is high, as for
higher difference in cost licensing encourages innovation. In a firm level anal-
ysis in China, Hu et al. (2005) also shows that the addition of technology
transfer, both foreign and domestic, raises the returns to indigenous R&D.
Moreover particularly in the present model in case of fixed-fee licensing, the
high cost firm licenses in the technology only if R&D activities reduces its
cost below a particular threshold. This idea therefore validates the comple-
mentary relation for higher difference in cost.
Fauli-Oller et al. (2013), Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2013) and Chang
et al. (2013) consider symmetric cost for the firms in the pre-licensing stage
and therefore licensing can takes place only when innovation activities are
carried out. However, the present paper considers asymmetric cost struc-
tures such the even if innovation activities are not undertaken, then also
technology may be transferred. Empirically, as ample evidence is observed
in regards to licensing of technology from a (foreign) firm to a domestic firm
even when R&D is not undertaken, it therefore validates cost asymmetry
rather than symmetry.7 In contrast to Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2013),
it is observed that the incentives for innovation is more (less) in fixed-fee
licensing than in two-part tariff/royalty licensing if the cost difference is low
(high). The welfare effect of innovation is also formalised. In fixed-fee li-
censing scheme innovation by the high cost firm increases welfare when the
6According to Hu et al. (2005) in China foreign technology transfer tends to be rela-
tively more intensive in the technologically less advanced industries, i.e. tobacco, textile,
apparel, leather, furniture, paper, printing, and rubber, in which firms spend equal or
greater amounts on foreign technology transfer than on R&D. The industries which are
thought to be more technologically sophisticated, such as pharmaceutical, electric, elec-
tronics, and instruments, invest far more in R&D than in technology transfer.
7In the literature on horizontal mergers (e.g., Farrell and Shapiro, 1990) cost asymmetry
and cost synergy also plays an important role. Lahiro and Ono (2004) presents a series of
theoretical tudies of important issues in international trade premised on the assumption
that firms have asymmetric costs.
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cost difference between the firms is high. On the other hand in case of roy-
alty licensing, the welfare effect is ambiguous. This posits an intervention
in regulating innovation by the government.
The scheme of this paper is follows. In section 2 and section 4 technology
transfer via fixed-fee and royalty (two-part tariff) respectively are discussed.
Section 3 and section 5 incorporate the incentive of the high-cost to innovate
and its effect on welfare under fixed-fee and royalty (two-part tariff) licensing
respectively. The last section finally concludes.
2. Technology transfer via fixed-fee
Consider a Cournot duopoly producing a homogeneous product. The
market demand is given by P = a − bQ, where Q is industry output. The
two firms, firm 1 and firm 2 produce output (Q1 and Q2) at constant unit
production cost c1 and c2 respectively(c1 > c2). P is the market price;
a, b > 0 are constants. Assume a > ci (i=1,2) and c1 < c¯1 =
a+c2
2 . For
c1 ≥ c¯1, firm 2 is the monopolist. The profits of the duopolists are given by
Πi(ci, cj) =
(a− 2ci + cj)2
9b
(1)
where i, j = (1, 2) and i 6= j. It is shown by Marjit (1990) that technology
is transferred from firm 2 to firm 1 via fixed-fee, as captured by a reduction
in the value of c1 to c2, if c1 ≤ 2a+3c25 = c˜1. This implies that if the cost
difference between the firms is not too high the transfer of technology will
take place.
In Wang (1998) firm 2 licenses its superior technology to firm 1 by charg-
ing a maximum fixed-fee (as enjoys full bargaining power) such that firm 1
is indifferent between licensing and not licensing. The present paper while
introduces Nash-Bargaining for determining fixed fee (f) in this duopoly
framework of cost asymmetry such that both firms gains after the technol-
ogy is transferred. The optimal value of f is solved by
max
f
[
Π1(c2, c2)− f −Π1(c1, c2)
][
Π2(c2, c2) + f −Π2(c2, c1)
]
(2)
such that Π1(c2, c2) − f ≥ Π1(c1, c2) and Π2(c2, c2) + f ≥ Π2(c2, c1) or
c1 ≤ c˜1. As for c1 > c˜1 there does not exist any f that would be mutually
beneficial. Π1(c2, c2) − f is the profit of firm 1 with the new technology
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net of payment of fixed-fee and Π2(c2, c2) + f is the sum of profit and fee
of firm 2 after the technology is transferred. Πi(ci, cj)’s for i = 1, 2 are the
pre-licensing profits (reservation pay-off). The optimal fixed fee for licensing
is
f∗(c1) =
Π2(c2, c1)−Π1(c1, c2)
2
= (c1 − c2)(2a− c1 − c2)/6b. (3)
Therefore transfer of technology will take place for c1 ≤ c˜1 and f = f∗(c1).
Proposition 1. Transfer of technology from the efficient firm to the techno-
logically inefficient firm in terms of fixed-fee takes place if c1 ≤ c˜1 and under
Nash-bargaining the optimal fixed-fee is f∗(c1) = (c1 − c2)(2a− c1 − c2)/6b.
The above proposition highlights two things. First, if c1 > c˜1 by reducing
c1 below c˜1 via innovation firm 1 can enjoy technology of firm 2. Second,
if c1 ≤ c˜1, it can also reduce the burden of fixed-fee by reducing its cost.
The next section therefore takes care of innovation incentives of firm 1 for
reducing its unit cost.
3. Incentives for innovation under fixed-fee licensing
As in Mukherjee & Pennings (2011) and Chang et al. (2013) the present
section incorporates only firm 1’s incentive to innovate for reducing its unit
cost in the pre-licensing stage.8 In Gallini & Winter (1985), where licensing
is through per-unit royalty, both firms make decisions on research (inno-
vation) for cost reduction in ex-ante period and production takes place in
the ex-post period. Moreover in Gallini & Winter (1985), the higher cost
firm (in pre-innovation stage) after innovation may turn out to be the lower
cost firm (in post-innovation stage) and can sell its technology to its rival.
Chang et al. (2013) also sets up a three-stage game in which only one of
the firms undertakes a cost-reducing R&D and may license the developed
technology to the others by means of a two-part tariff (i.e., a per-unit royalty
and an upfront fee) contract. However, in the present paper this is not pos-
sible. Contrarily the present paper allows innovation by firm 1 but restrict
the possibility of turning out to be the lower cost firm in the post-innovation
stage. Holding firm 2 inactive in regards to innovation is to observe firm 1’s
incentive to innovate even if it knows that it cannot outstrip firm 2 in cost.
8It can be assumed that firm 2’s unit cost is very low and it does not innovate as
undertaking innovation activities for further cost reduction is very costly.
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Without loss of any generality it is assumed that c2 = 0. Firm 1 invests
an amount K (> 0) and the post-innovation cost of firm 1 ( say c) follows
a uniform distribution in the interval [0, c1], where c1 is the initial unit cost
of firm 1 in the pre-innovation stage.
Consider c1 ≤ c˜1, and let L(c1) be the profit (net) of firm 1 after tech-
nology transfer if innovation activities are not undertaken and f∗(c1) is the
optimal fixed-fee. Then L(c1) = Π1(c1, 0) − f∗(c1) = a29b − c1(2a−c1)6b . In-
deed, as the solution to the bargaining game is mutually beneficial therefore
L(c1) ≥ Π1(c1, 0) for c1 ≤ c˜1. It follows that, for any c1:∫ ca
0
L(c)g(c)dc+
∫ c1
ca
Π1(c, 0)g(c)dc ≥
∫ c1
0
Π1(c, 0)g(c)dc (4)
where ca = min{c1, c˜1}. The left hand side and the right hand side of the
above inequality measures respectively the expected returns from investment
when technology is transferable and when technology is not transferable9.
Thus no matter what the cost of firm 1 is, the expected returns from invest-
ment are always greater when technology is transferable.
Under fixed-fee licensing, for all c1 > c˜1, when the firm does not invest
it gets Π1(c1, 0), whether or not technology is transferable, as there is no
mutually beneficial solution to the bargaining game. Thus incentives to
invest are stronger when technology is transferable because∫ c˜1
0
L(c)g(c)dc+
∫ c1
c˜1
Π1(c, 0)g(c)dc−Π1(c1, 0) >
∫ c1
0
Π1(c, 0)g(c)−Π1(c1, 0)
(5)
where the left hand side is M(c1) and the right hand side is M0(c1). M(c1)
is the expected increase in profit due to innovation when technology is trans-
ferable and M0(c1) is the expected increase in profit due to innovation when
technology is not transferable. The expected increase in profit due to inno-
vation can be called as the “innovation incentives”.10
On the other hand for all c1 ≤ c˜1, when the firm does not invest it
gets L(c1, 0), as technology is transferable, as there is mutually beneficial
9It can be considered that the Government is restricting the transfer of technology.
10In the rest of the paper the term “innovation incentives” is used hence forth to signify
the expected increase in profit due to innovation.
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solution to the bargaining game. However incentives to invest may not be
stronger when technology is transferable because for c1 ≤ c˜1∫ c1
0
L(c)g(c)dc− L(c1) may not be ≤
∫ c1
0
Π1(c, 0)g(c)−Π1(c1, 0) (6)
where the left hand side is M(c1) and the right hand side is M0(c1).
From equation (5) and (6), we get
M(c1) =
3ac1 − 2c21
18b
for c1 ≤ c˜1
=
a3z
bc1
+
2ac1
9b
− 8c
2
1
27b
for c1 > c˜1 (7)
where z = 0.002963 and
M0(c1) =
2ac1
9b
− 8c
2
1
27b
. (8)
To decide on whether it invests or not the firm compares M(c1) or M0(c1)
with K. If technology is transferable, firm 1 innovates if M(c1) > K. On the
other hand if technology is not transferable, firm 1 innovates if M0(c1) > K.
It will be interesting to compare the innovation incentives with and without
the possibility of technology transfer with the help of Figure 1 (see Appendix
A.1). From figure 1, it follows that only if c1 ≤ cˆ1(< c˜1), the incentives is
more when technology is not transferable than without it, i.e
M(c1) < M0(c1) if c1 < cˆ1,
M(c1) = M0(c1) if c1 = cˆ1 and
M(c1) > M0(c1) if c1 > cˆ1
where cˆ1 =
3a
8 and c˜1 =
2a
5 . Therefore the incentive for innovation is higher
under the possibility of technology transfer if the cost difference is high or
c1 > cˆ1. The expected returns from investment are inverted U shaped (see
Figure 1) not only technology is transferable but also when it is not. This
suggests that incentives to invest (whether technology is transferable or not)
are initially increasing and then decreasing in c1.
For c1 ≤ c˜1, as technology is transferred whether firm 1 innovates or not
(if technology is transferable), the motive behind innovation is to reduce the
fixed-fee (f∗) by reducing its pre-transfer unit cost (as df
∗
dc1
> 0, see equation
8
Figure 1: Innovation incentives: Fixed-fee
3) or to increase its reservation pay-off. If c1 is close to 0, through innovation
the unit cost can be reduced marginally. Therefore the gains from reduction
in fixed-fee M(c1) is lower than M0(c1). Firm 1 will not innovate if c1 is
very low such that (see figure 1) K = K1 > M0(c1) > M(c1). Similarly if
c1 is marginally below c˜1 the possibility of reducing the unit cost of firm 1
is much higher. The optimal fixed-fee can thereby be reduced significantly
and therefore M(c1) > M0(c1). However for c˜1 < c1 < c¯1 the incentives
to invest are stronger when technology is transferable (M(c1) > M0) as in
that case the firm can have the access of the technology of firm 2 if the
post-innovation unit cost c is below c˜1.
Proposition 2. The possibility of licensing via fixed-fee encourages inno-
vation if the cost difference between the firms is high and discourages inno-
vation if the cost difference is low.
In Gallini & Winter (1985) under royalty licensing the availability of
licensing encourages research when the firm’s initial cost difference is small,
while the present paper shows how the availability of licensing encourages
innovation if the cost difference between the firms is high and discourages
innovation if the cost difference is low. It is discussed later in the present
paper that this result holds even in case of royalty licensing. (See Proposition
5) It is also to be noted that if the licensing game gives full bargaining power
9
to firm 2 as in Wang (1998), in figure 1, the curve M will coincide with M0.
Then whether government allows licensing or not, innovation incentives will
be unaffected.
3.1. Welfare effects
This section discusses the effects on welfare in the presence of licensing
possibilities. Welfare is defined as the sum of industry profit and consumer
surplus. Let c1 ≤ c˜1, this implies that if firm 1 does not undertake innova-
tion activities then also technology is transferred. Though in this case firm
1 gets benefit from innovation, from the industry point it is not desirable.
This type of innovation only affects the fixed-fee (f∗) which has no role in
increasing the post-transfer industry profit and output. The cost of inno-
vation acts as a leakage for the industry in the form of paying an outsider
the innovation fee (K). Therefore, undertaking innovation activities only
for reducing the fixed fee (f∗) is welfare reducing.
Let us consider the other case c1 > c˜1. As innovation by firm 1 increases
the profit of firm 1 as M(c1) > K, we therefore focus on the other effects,
i.e. on the profit of firm 2 and on the consumer surplus. Let the expected
profit of firm 2 (after innovation by firm 1) be J(c1), where (c˜1 < c1 < c¯1)
J(c1) =
∫ c˜1
0
{
Π2(0, 0) + f
∗(c)
}
g(c)dc+
∫ c1
c˜1
Π2(0, c)g(c)dc. (9)
From Appendix A.2, equation (A.2) we get
J(c1)−Π2(0, c1) = a
3z
bc1
− ac1
9b
− 2c1
2
27b
, (10)
which is the expected increase in profit of firm 2 where z = 0.002963. On the
other hand pre-innovation, industry output is Q1+Q2 =
2a−c1
3b and consumer
surplus is equal to CS(c1) =
(2a−c1)2
18b . Hence the expected consumer surplus
(ECS) after innovation by firm 1 is
ECS(c1) =
∫ c˜1
0
CS(0)g(c)dc+
∫ c1
c˜1
CS(c)g(c)dc. (11)
Therefore the expected increase in consumer surplus if firm 1 innovates is
(see Appendix A.3, equation (A.3))
ECS(c1)− CS(c1) = a
3v
bc1
+
ac1
9b
− c1
2
27b
(12)
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where v = 0.061037. As the sum of expected increase in consumer surplus
and profit of firm 2 is positive or ECS(c1)−CS(c1)+J(c1)−Π2(0, c1) > 0 (see
Appendix A.4), innovation by firm 1 will definitely increase the welfare. This
ensures that if firm 1 innovates (when M(c1) > K) the welfare (expected)
will definitely increase.
4. Two-part tariff licensing
The present literature on licensing (see Rostocker, 1984) apart from
fixed-fee licensing also deals with two-part tariff and per-unit royalty con-
tract. Hence this section deals with two-part tariff contract, a combination
of fixed-fee (f) and per unit royalty (r), as a tool of technology transfer in
the basic model outlined in section 2. For simplicity we assume c2 = 0 here
also. The innovation incentives are also re-analysed for these new forms of
licensing contract.
It has been pointed out by Shapiro (1985) that “....under the antitrust
laws, and for a good reason! ... a reasonable constraint to put on the
two-part tariff contract is that the fixed-fee be non-negative” and “... the
licensing contract cannot raise the licensee’s unit costs (production cost plus
royalty).” This section also introduces Nash-Bargaining for determining the
fixed fee and royalty. The optimal value of f, r is solved by
max
(f,r)
[
Πr1(c1)−Π1(c1, 0)
][
Πr2(c1)−Π2(0, c1)
]
(13)
subject to f ≥ 0, c1 ≥ r ≥ 0, Πri (c1) − Πi(ci, cj) ≥ 0; i, j = 1, 2 (i 6= j).
Πri (c1) and Πi(ci, cj) are the post-transfer and pre-transfer profit of firm i
respectively; Πr1(c1) =
(a−2r)2
9b − f , Π1(c1, 0) = (a−2c1)
2
9b , Π
r
2(c1) =
(a+r)2
9b +
r(a−2r)
3b + f and Π2(0, c1) =
(a+c1)2
9b .
Solving the above problem we find that the optimal f is zero and optimal
r = r∗(c1) = a2 −
√
100a2−280ac1+160c21
20 (see Appendix A.5, equation (A.5)).
Under this contract the technology is always transferred for c1 < c¯1 and the
profits of firm 1 and firm 2 after licensing are
Πr1(c1) =
a2
9b
+
8c21 − 14ac1
45b
(14)
and
Πr2(c1) =
a2
9b
+
7ac1 − 4c21
18b
. (15)
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respectively. If c1 > c¯1, technology is not transferred as the monopolist (firm
2) will always be worse off if it transfers the technology.
Proposition 3. Under two-part tariff contract, technology is transferred if
and only if c1 < c¯1. Under Nash-bargaining, the equilibrium fixed-fee is zero
and royalty is r∗(c1) = a2 −
√
100a2−280ac1+160c21
20 .
For a similar type of analysis one may see Kishimoto & Moto (2012), where
using Nash-bargaining fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing are dealt sep-
arately. As for two-part tariff licensing Nash-bargaining sets fixed-fee to
be zero and a positive royalty rate r∗, therefore r∗ is also the optimal per-
unit royalty under Nash-bargaining for royalty licensing. Therefore in the
present context “royalty licensing” and “two-part tariff licensing” are used
interchangeably for the rest of the analysis.
5. Incentives for innovation under royalty licensing
Let us analyse firm 1’s incentive to innovate for reducing its unit cost in
case of royalty licensing. The cost after innovation (c) is assumed to follow
a uniform distribution in [0, c1] as before. As in fixed-fee licensing, here
also innovation incentives before the transfer of technology arises only for
increasing the reservation pay-off or for reducing the per unit royalty rates
for buying the technology. Indeed, because the solution to the bargaining
game is mutually beneficial we have Πr1(c1) > Π1(c1, 0) for c1 < c¯1. It follows
that, for any c1: ∫ c1
0
Πr1(c)g(c)dc >
∫ c1
0
Π1(c, 0)g(c)dc. (16)
The left hand side measures the expected returns from investment when tech-
nology is transferable and the right hand side measures the expected returns
from investment when it is not. Therefore as in fixed-fee licensing no matter
what the cost of firm 1 is, the expected returns from investment are always
greater when technology is transferable.
The expected increase in profit due to innovation when technology is
transferable is
H(c1) =
∫ c1
0
Πr1(c)g(c)dc−Πr1(c1) =
21ac1 − 16c21
135b
. (17)
Firm 1 decides to innovate if H(c1) > K. However M(c1) (see equation
7) is the expected increase in profit due to innovation when technology is
12
Figure 2: Innovation incentives: Fixed-fee vs Royalty
transferable via fixed-fee and M0(c1) (see equation 8) is the expected increase
in profit due to innovation when technology is not transferable.
Figure 2 (see Appendix A.6) shows how the innovation incentives vary
under different forms of licensing contract. The innovation incentives are
more in case of royalty licensing than in fixed-fee licensing only if the initial
cost (cost difference) of firm 1 is very high, i.e. H(c1) > M(c1) if c1 is high.
Proposition 4. Fixed-fee licensing scheme gives more incentive to innovate
than royalty licensing if the cost difference between firms is low.
Therefore given the cost of innovation firm 1 may change the decision to-
wards innovation if the licensing scheme changes. One can explain the above
proposition in the following manner. Let us begin with the case c1 ≤ c˜1,
where technology may be transferred profitably without innovation both in
fixed-fee as well as in royalty licensing. For firm 1 profit in royalty licensing
is higher than in fixed-fee licensing (Πr1(c1) > L(c1),)
11. The difference in
11Royalty licensing always leads to higher industry profit than in fixed-fee licensing due
to lower competitive effect. Therefore the Nash-bargaining outcome also ensures higher
profit for both the firms in royalty licensing than in fixed-fee licensing.
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profit, δ(c1) = Π
r
1(c1) − L(c1), also increases in c1. Therefore the expected
increase in profit after innovation is more in fixed-fee licensing than in two-
part tariff licensing12. On the other hand for c1 > c˜1, the incentives for
innovation remains higher for fixed-fee licensing than in the royalty licens-
ing for cost slightly higher than c˜1. This happens due to higher probability
of getting the superior technology after innovation if slightly higher cost
prohibits technology transfer under fixed-fee licensing. Contrarily the pos-
sibility of technology transfer after innovation is less likely for higher cost
in fixed-fee licensing. This explains the lower incentive in fixed-fee than in
royalty licensing for higher cost as under royalty licensing technology is al-
ways transferred.
Let us compare the innovation incentives with and without the possibil-
ity to licensing. H(c1) is the expected increase in profit due to innovation or
innovation incentives when technology is transferable via royalty. However
M0(c1), is the innovation incentives when technology is not transferable.
Figure 3 shows that for lower unit cost, if government allows licensing, in-
Figure 3: Innovation incentives: Royalty
centive for innovation will decrease; while for higher unit cost, allowing
licensing will increase incentive for innovation.
12For 0 < c1 < c˜1 the difference of expected increase in profit in fixed-fee li-
censing and expected increase in profit in two-part tariff licensing is [
∫ c1
0
L(c)g(c)dc −
L(c1)]− [
∫ c1
0
Πr1(c)g(c)dc−Πr1(c1)] = Πr1(c1)− L(c1)−
∫ c1
0
[Πr1(c)− L(c)]g(c)dc = δ(c1)−∫ c1
0
δ(c)g(c)dc > 0 as δ(c) ≤ δ(c1), c ∈ [0, c1].
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Proposition 5. The possibility of licensing via royalty encourages innova-
tion if the cost difference between the firms is high and discourages innova-
tion if the cost difference is low.
In case of royalty licensing also if full bargaining power is bestowed on firm
2 as in Wang (1998), innovation incentives will be unaffected by licensing
opportunities. This implies that whatever be the form of licensing contract,
fixed-fee or per-unit royalty, innovation incentives is unaffected by licensing
opportunities if full bargaining power is enjoyed by firm 2.
From Proposition 4 & Proposition 5, it can be argued that the incentive
for innovation irrespective of licensing scheme (both in fixed-fee and in roy-
alty licensing) is more without the possibility of technology transfer if the
initial cost (cost difference) is low. On the other hand it is less without
any barriers to technology transfer if the initial cost (cost difference) is high.
This proposition is just in contrast to Gallini & Winter (1985), where royalty
licensing encourages research if the cost difference is low. This paper shows
that under Nash-bargaining fixed-fee as well as royalty licensing encourages
research if the cost difference is high.
5.1. Welfare effects
Whether innovation will increase welfare and how welfare after innova-
tion depends on the initial cost is being discussed. As in this case technology
is always licensed consumer surplus without innovation is
CSr(c1) =
4a2 − 4ar∗ + r∗2
18b
(18)
where industry output and price are 2a−r
∗
3b and
a+r∗
3 respectively. Therefore
the expected increase in consumer surplus due to innovation is
ErCS(c1)− CSr(c1) =
∫ c1
0
CSr(c)g(c)dc− CSr(c1) = V (c1) + 21ac1 − 16c
2
1
1080b
(19)
where
V (c1) =
a
120b
[ ∫ c1
0
1
c1
√
100a2 − 280ac+ 160c2dc−
√
100a2 − 280ac1 + 160c21
]
.
Moreover the expected increase in profit of firm 2 due to innovation is
Jr(c1)−Πr2(c1) =
∫ c1
0
Πr2(c)g(c)dc−Πr2(c1) =
16c21 − 21ac1
108b
. (20)
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Therefore the expected increase in welfare (expected increase in profit of
firm 1, firm 2 & consumer surplus) after innovation is
H(c1)−K + ErCS(c1)− CSr(c1) + Jr(c1)−Πr2(c1) (21)
= H(c1)−K + V (c1)− 21ac1 − 16c
2
1
120b
. (22)
It has been shown that V (c1) − 21ac1−16c
2
1
120b < 0 (see Appendix A.7). There-
fore the welfare effect is ambiguous which posits a regulatory role for the
government to curb innovation if K is very high (close to H(c1)). As in this
case innovation by firm 1 will always reduce welfare.
6. Conclusion
This paper shows that in Cournot framework under Nash-bargaining the
optimal fixed-fee licensing contract allows transfer if the cost difference is
low. On the other hand it has been found that under two-part tariff li-
censing optimal fixed-fee is zero and the licensing is only through per-unit
royalty and technology is always transferred. Secondly, the present analysis
also addresses how incentive to innovate is affected by the optimal licensing
scheme, where technology transfer between the firms may occur after the
innovation decision is made by the inefficient firm. It has been shown that
the incentive towards innovation is more in fixed-fee licensing than in two-
part tariff (royalty) licensing if cost difference between firms is low. The
result is opposite when the cost difference is high. Therefore given the cost
of innovation, the firm may change the decision towards innovation if the
licensing scheme changes.
In fixed-fee licensing if the cost difference is low such that without in-
novation also technology will be transferred, innovation will unambiguously
reduce the welfare. On the other hand the in fixed-fee licensing innovation
by firm 1 increases welfare if high cost difference prohibits technology li-
censing initially. Contrarily the welfare effect of innovation is ambiguous in
royalty licensing. Finally, irrespective of licensing scheme the incentive to
innovate is more with barriers to technology transfer than without it if the
cost difference is low. On the other hand when the cost difference is high
allowing licensing gives more incentive to innovate.
In the present era of globalization and integration technology transfer
between firms has become more common than ever. The present model can
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be used to envisage a role of the government in the developing countries.
Suppose the low cost firm and the high cost firm are located in developed
and developing respectively and compete in quantities in the market of the
developing country. The paper then predicts, once the developing country
allows licensing the incentives to innovate of the inefficient firm may either
increase or decrease. This depends on the technology difference with the
efficient firm. It can also be argued that the government of developing
country may give incentive to the home (inefficient) firm in the form of
subsidy for innovation if sufficiently high initial cost prohibits technology
transfer. This model can also be extended to the literature of strategic trade
as in Ghosh & Saha (2008), if we consider that the two firms compete in a
third country. The role of the government in regards to allowing licensing
and innovation activities can be considered further.
Appendix A.
Appendix A.1.
From equation (8) we have M0(c1) =
2ac1
9b −
8c21
27b for 0 < c1 < c¯1.
For c1 ∈ (0, c˜1], M(c1) −M0(c1) = 10c
2
1−3ac1
54b , as M(c1) =
3ac1−2c21
18b . Ini-
tially M(c1) −M0(c1) < 0 for c1 < 3a10 = cˆ1, and M −M0 = 0 at c1 = 3a10 .
Finally for c˜1 ≥ c1 > cˆ1, M(c1) > M0(c1).
For c1 > c˜1, M(c1) =
a3z
bc1
+ 2ac19b −
8c21
27b where z = 0.002963; and M(c1)−
M0(c1) =
a3z
bc1
> 0.
Appendix A.2.
From equation (9) of the main text
J(c1) =
∫ c˜1
0
[
Π2(0, 0) + f
∗(c)
]
g(c)dc+
∫ c1
c˜1
Π2(0, c)g(c)dc
=
∫ c˜1
0
1
c1
[
a2
9b
+
c(2a− c)
6b
]
dc+
∫ c1
c˜1
1
c1
(a+ c)2
9b
dc
=
a3z
bc1
+
a2
9b
+
ac1
9b
+
c1
2
27b
(A.1)
where z = 0.002963. Therefore
J(c1)−Π2(0, c1) = a
3z
bc1
− ac1
9b
− 2c1
2
27b
, (A.2)
which is equation (10) in the main text.
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Appendix A.3.
From equation (11), we find that
ECS(c1)− CS(c1) =
∫ c˜1
0
CS(0)g(c)dc+
∫ c1
c˜1
CS(c)g(c)dc− CS(c1)
=
∫ c˜1
0
2a2
9bc1
dc+
∫ c1
c˜1
(2a− c)2
18bc1
dc− (2a− c1)
2
18b
=
a3v
bc1
+
ac1
9b
− c1
2
27b
(A.3)
where v = 0.061037, which is equation (12) in the main text.
Appendix A.4.
From equations (8) and (12), it can be said that ECS(c1) − CS(c1) +
J(c1)−Π2(0, c1) = a3vbc1 + ac19b − c1
2
27b +
a3z
bc1
− ac19b − 2c1
2
27b =
a3(v+z)
bc1
− c129b > 0 for
c˜1 < c1 < c¯1, where z and v is defined in Appendix A.2 and Appendix A.3
respectively.
Appendix A.5.
From equation (13), the objective function is
Z =
[
Πr1(c1)−Π1(c1, 0)
][
Πr2(c1)−Π2(0, c1)
]
(A.4)
then δZδf =
[
Πr1(c1)−Π1(c1, 0)
]
−
[
Πr2(c1)−Π2(0, c1)
]
and
δZ
δr =
a−2r
9b
[
5(Πr1(c1)−Π1(c1, 0))− 4(Πr2(c1)−Π2(0, c1))
]
.
Now optimal f and r cannot be positive simultaneously as the second
order condition is not satisfied for this Kuhn-Tucker maximization problem.
Let assume that optimal f is positive then δZδf = 0. Solving this we get
f = (2ac1 − c21 − 3ar + 3r2)/6b and δZδr = a−2r9b (Πr1 − Π1(c1, 0)). Therefore
a possible solution, say solution A, is f = (2ac1 − c21)/6b > 0, c1 ≤ c˜1 and
r = 0. Similarly the other possible solution, say solution B, is f = 0 and
c1 > r > 0. Solving
δZ
δr = 0, we get
r = r∗(c1) =
a
2
−
√
100a2 − 280ac1 + 160c21
20
. (A.5)
Its been found that Z is higher for solution B than for solution A. Therefore
solution B is the optimal solution.
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Appendix A.6.
For c1 ≤ c˜1, from equations (7) and (17) we have, H(c1) < M(c1) as
M(c1) − H(c1) = 3ac1+2c
2
1
270b . For c˜1 < c1 < c¯1, from equations (7) and (17)
we have, H(c1)−M(c1) = 24c
2
1−9ac1
135b − a
3z
bc1
and is positive if c1 is close to c¯1.
Appendix A.7.
From equation (22) we consider only the term V (c1)− 21ac1−16c
2
1
120b = U(c1)
for 0 < c1 < c¯1, where
U(c1) =
a
120b
[ ∫ c1
0
1
c1
√
100a2 − 280ac+ 160c2dc−
√
100a2 − 280ac1 + 160c21
]
−
21ac1−16c21
120b .
Let N(c) =
√
100a2 − 280ac+ 160c2, N ′(c) ≤ 0 and N ′′(c) > 0. There-
fore,
120bU(c1) = U¯(c1) =
a
c1
∫ c1
0
[N(c)−N(c1)]dc+ 16c21 − 21ac1 (A.6)
where
∫ c1
0 [N(c)−N(c1)]dc ≤ c1[N(0)−N(c1)]2 =
c1[10a−
√
100a2−280ac1+160c21]
2 .
Therefore, U¯(c1) ≤ D = a[10a−
√
100a2−280ac1+160c21]
2 + 16c
2
1 − 21ac1 =
(a − c1)(5a − 16c1) − a
√
100a2−280ac1+160c21
2 . Therefore U(c1) < 0, as D < 0
for c1 ∈ (0, c¯1).
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